Avis de soutenance - doctorat - Geoffroy CLAIN

The purpose of this study was to assess how the material support of armies altered military maneuver. Although logistics played a decisive role in the course of military events during the early Republic, it was largely taken over by the political authorities. However, behind a desire for display and clear successes, there does not appear to have been any absolute linearity in the implementation of support processes from the political level down to the troops in contact with the enemy. The recovery of the frontiers between 1793 and 1794, marking the shift of the revolutionary armies from the defensive to the offensive, stands out as the most fertile period in terms of change. Important though this moment was, logistics must be understood within a broader framework (upstream preparation, direct support, and post-combat regeneration), which requires the support of armies to be examined over a period extending from the late 1780s (the period of transformation of the royal army) to the Treaty of Campo Formio in 1797 (which brought the sequence of the Wars of the First Coalition to a close). Logistics also appears as a field complementary to societal or economic approaches. In 1792, from a strictly military point of view, the army relied on an organization inherited from the Seven Years' War and from the reforms of the 1770s and 1780s. These reforms were poorly understood, or understood to a lesser extent, by the Coalition armies. Logistics quickly had to keep pace with operational maneuver and be rethought through new structures. This was a real challenge for a government that was itself in the process of reforming. A “centralized” response was therefore initiated. In the field, however, these developments bore fruit only with difficulty. Even so, when viewed through the prism of logistical results, it clearly appears that the Coalition forces were unable to break through the French defensive lines. Their siege policy was of no use to them, since it did not undermine the logistical strength of the Republic. The requisition mechanisms, reflecting the effort of the entire nation, proved effective in holding firm. Moreover, French reserves of supplies remained sufficient. In this context, the levies of 1793 stand as the dividing line between two modes of operation: that inherited from the royal army, and that of a mass army, which would soon shift to an offensive posture on almost all fronts. In logistical terms, the figures involved became unprecedented, requiring the establishment of robust structures to ensure military support: centrally, a ministry and then Commissions; in the provinces and with the armies, through representatives who were an outgrowth of this policy, backed by a considerable industrial effort with many ramifications. A crucial element in troop support, medical capabilities were a defining feature of this effort. Later, the difficulties encountered by the armies in obtaining supplies, together with the political choice to expand the conflict, led to the deployment of an “expeditionary war” beyond the Rhine and the Alps. The results, however, were limited. The armies deployed in Germany revealed their shortcomings, the weight of their logistics being too heavy a burden to sustain abroad. Victory in Italy, even though it inaugurated maneuvers on rear lines and an efficient use of logistics, was above all made possible by the influx of cash. Thus, the administrative reorganization of the post-Thermidor period and the Directory proved innovative, but with limited gains. The armies were dependent on the new Commission for Supplies. The lack of funds prevented suppliers from fulfilling their commitments, the provisioning of strongholds was very poor, and the armies were forced to live from day to day. In sum, at every level of military planning, new arrangements were grafted onto older ones, paving the way for armies that would deploy even larger numbers under the Consulate and the Empire.